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Policing Right-Wing Dictatorships: Some
preliminary comparisons of Fascist
Italy, Nazi Germany and Franco’s Spain
Jonathan Dunnage
1 Over the last two decades, there has been a growing historiographical interest in the
policing of right-wing dictatorships. This has mainly focused on Nazi Germany and Nazi-
occupied territories.  There  has  also  been an attempt  to  undertake  a  more  thorough
investigation of the Italian Fascist police. While historians have examined in some detail
Francoist repression within the general context of the history of the Spanish civil war and
the ensuing dictatorship, most research has not focused more specifically on the role of
the police forces. This essay analyses and compares the policing of Fascist Italy,  Nazi
Germany and Franco’s Spain2.  It both illustrates the contrasting features of the police
systems concerned and attempts to identify similar patterns of development that might
allow us to move towards the formulation of a model for the creation of police systems at
the disposal of right-wing dictatorships. Can we, for example, attribute the role of the
police in supporting right-wing movements in their ascendancy to power to similar or
identical factors? Can we identify a specific police mentality common to the three
countries  investigated  that  allows  us  to  understand  better  the  transition  to  fascist3
dictatorships and the compliance of ‘ordinary’ policemen in running them? How far did
the  fascist  regimes  concerned  incorporate  pre-existing  policing  systems  (and  their
personnel), and how did this determine levels of loyalty, efficiency, coercion and terror?
2 The sections that follow analyse the Fascist, Nazi and Francoist police systems according
to specific areas. The first section considers the role of the police in the ascendancy of
right-wing movements, placing emphasis on not only political factors, but also matters
concerning the internal  functioning of  the police,  as  determining support  for  fascist
movements. An examination of the structures and juridical and ideological bases of the
fascist  police  systems  follows, also  with  a  view  to  identifying  levels  of  continuity/
discontinuity with the policing of previous regimes. The subsequent section analyses the
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extent to which (and manner in which) these systems employed professional policemen
(as  opposed  to  non-professional  political  figures).  The  final  section  compares  and
contrasts the employment of terror in the police systems analyzed.
 
The role of the police in the ascendancy of fascist
movements
3 We may attribute  police  support  of  fascist  movements  to  a  combination  of  political
sympathies,  difficulties  in  law  and  order  maintenance  and ambiguous  government
policing strategies. In Italy, during the ‘Biennio Rosso’ (‘Red Two Years’) of 1919-1920, the
police forces had to contend with an increase in crime levels and a growth in working-
class militancy backed by a Revolutionary Socialist Party. Moreover, they lacked men and
resources, having emerged from the First World War in a state of extreme fragility4. The
peasant and working class movements backed by the Socialist Party had historically been
the ‘enemy’ of the Italian police. Since unification, governments had tended to deal with
social and political unrest in an authoritarian manner, frequently calling in the army or
Carabinieri (military police) to put down strikes and demonstrations. This often resulted
in casualties, and perpetuated a historic mistrust between the police and the worker and
peasant classes. During the ‘Biennio Rosso’, the level of conflict between the police and
workers/peasants intensified,  with the number of deaths and injuries at the scene of
unrest increasing5.
4 High casualty levels may have been the consequence of a sense of vulnerability on the
part of the forces of law and order. However, it is likely that an excessive militarization of
the  post-war  police  was  also  behind  this6.  Indicating  a  pattern  not  dissimilar  to
developments in Weimar Germany and the Spanish Second Republic (discussed below),
the urban security guards (Guardie di Città) of the Interior Ministrywere transformed into
a militarized police,  the Guardie  Regie,in October 1919.  This move would theoretically
grant the Interior Ministry autonomy from the army in matters of policing, relegating the
Carabinieri to rural areas. In practice, however, the military character of the Guardie Regie
was accentuated to the extent that the civilian police authorities of the Interior Ministry
did  not  have  complete  control  over  them.  The  corps  largely  modelled  itself  on  the
Carabinieri and recruited considerable numbers of guards and officers from the army. Its
relationship with the working class movement was highly confrontational. Moreover, the
Guardie Regie continued to work alongside the Carabinieri in both the cities and rural areas,
often jointly employed in the repression of the same public order disturbance7.
5 Police support for Fascism was partly a product of the confrontational nature of their
relationship with the peasant and working class movements during the ‘Biennio Rosso’.
However, it was also a consequence of their contempt for the law and order policy of
post-war Liberal governments, which on many occasion angered the police by ordering
them to show restraint in dealing with strikes and demonstrations. On the one hand,
governments desired where possible to make social, economic and political concessions
to  the  working  classes.  We  should consider  this  in  the  context  of  democratic
advancements  in  post-war  Italy,  including  the  introduction  in  1919  of  proportional
parliamentary representation that saw a dramatic increase in influence of mass parties.
On the other, they feared that they were insufficiently equipped to repress large-scale
revolutionary initiatives. This was the case during the metallurgical factory occupations
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of August 1920, when the prime minister, Giovanni Giolitti, ordered the police and army
not  to  intervene.  It  is  unlikely  that  the  police  or  the  middle  classes  understood  or
accepted this strategy, in spite of its success in defusing the revolutionary character of
the occupations.
6 In the autumn of 1920, the Italian police began to give support to the developing Fascist
movement8.  This  ranged  from passive  acceptance  of  their  illegal  activities  to  active
participation  in  ‘punitive  expeditions’  against  left-wing  strongholds.  In  the  face  of
‘revolutionary’ worker action, that political leaders appeared unable or unwilling to deal
with, many members of the police accepted help from the Fascist movement in order to
restore  law and order.  Yet,  we should also  consider  the  ability  of  the  movement  to
ostracize as ‘Socialist’ and ‘unpatriotic’, through their press and public demonstrations,
those policemen that attempted to repress it. Others had genuine political sympathies for
a movement founded on patriotism and anti-Socialism. Some had fought alongside future
Fascists during the First World War. Insults against the police in the Socialist press, often
of a highly personal nature, increased the attractiveness of Fascism. Institutional factors
relating to the police also helped to determine their attitude towards Fascism. Greater
Carabinieri support may have been the result  of  resentment towards post-war Liberal
governments, which had expanded and militarized the Interior Ministry police in 1919,
partly at their expense. Sven Reichardt argues, however, that the limited hierarchical
control  that  the  Prefect  (government-appointed  head  of  the  province)  was  able  to
exercise over the Carabinieri also explains this9.
7 Ambiguous  government  policy  also  encouraged  police  tolerance  of  Fascist  violence.
Giolitti’s inclusion of Fascist candidates in the government list in the May 1921 general
election indicated a desire to accommodate and tame Fascism, rather than outlaw it.
Many police commanders ignored official orders to prevent Fascist violence during the
election campaign and on polling day, since they felt that it was their duty to ensure the
victory of government-supporting candidates. Similarly, in the summer of 1921 the new
prime  minister,  Ivanoe  Bonomi,  ordered  the  outlawing  of  theArditi  del  Popolo  (a
paramilitary organization independent of  both the Socialist  and Communist  Parties10,
founded to defend the working class against Fascist violence) as an armed and criminal
association, whilst merely continuing to order the repression of Fascist violence. This
suggested to the police and judiciary that the government saw Fascism as far less of a
threat than the Left11.
8 We can also attribute the attitude of the police to longer-standing cultural factors that
were particular to Italy. They were accustomed to tolerating private forms of policing and
political  violence.  In  the  Po  Valley,  for  example,  Fascism  had  its  roots  in  pre-war
employer vigilantism against the peasant movement. The local police mainly accepted
this  phenomenon.  The  ‘clientelistic’  basis  of  Italian  state  administration  created  a
situation in  which corruption and political  violence  were  acceptable,  as  evident,  for
example, in the role given to the Prefect (the highest provincial authority in policing) in
guaranteeing the return of government supporters at elections. This system ambiguously
tied police officials to social élites. It gave them considerable autonomy of action with the
risk of reducing their loyalty to superiors or government12.
9 Policemen  that  actively  supported  the  Fascist  movement  would  be  rewarded  after
Mussolini’s rise to power13. However, it is clear that a large number hesitated or merely
acted in accordance with what they interpreted as government policy. While it was one
thing for them to benefit from the help of Fascists in fighting Socialism, it was another to
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oppose directly government orders. We should remember, too, that there were incidents
in which both the Carabinieri and the Guardie Regie killed and injured Fascists. When by
the summer of 1922 a Fascist political victory seemed inevitable, policemen that were not
pro-Fascist thought very carefully about the professional consequences of making a name
for themselves as anti-Fascists. The best solution was to strike a balance between not
compromising themselves excessively either way. Police and army reactions to initial
government orders to prevent a Fascist  seizure of  power at  the end of  October 1922
varied between energetic resistance (with Fascists being injured or killed) and surrender,
though clear cases of active collaboration with the Fascists are difficult to identify. In the
end, full-scale conflict between government and Fascist forces did not take place, as the
prime minister, Luigi De Facta, retracted an order for the establishment of military rule
and Mussolini was invited to become prime minister14.
10 How does the Italian situation compare with the development of right-wing dictatorships
in Germany and Spain? In the Weimar Republic, there was evidence from the late
twenties  onwards  of  police  support  for  the  Nazi  movement.  Similar  to  the  Italian
situation, this attitude was a product of political sympathies, difficulties in law and order
maintenance and ambiguities surrounding government police strategies. The founding of
the  Weimar  Republic  saw  the  creation  in  1920  of  the  Schutzpolizei,  intended  as  a
professional and democratic police force (‘suited to a new, modern, democratic epoch’15)
that  would  develop  a  trusting  relationship  with  the  population  and  alleviate  the
suspicions of the public, especially the working classes. Hsi-Huey Liang argues that the
police leaders of the new Republic wanted to shed the traditional authoritarian image of
the police in order to create a people’s force under the motto ‘The Police, Your Friend and
Assistant’16. According to Richard Bessel, there were several flaws in this. Although the
Schutzpolizei were supposed to be a civil force subordinate to regional administration, in
many  respects  this  was  a  reorganized  version  of  the  short-lived  Sicherheitspolizei,
disbanded on the orders of the Allies in 1920 because of their paramilitary character and
questionable democratic credentials. There remained a prevalence of military forms of
training and tactics and military personnel among the officers. The Schutzpolizei had to
face high levels of  crime during the early years of the Weimar Republic due to food
shortages and revolutionary unrest. Though crime levels dropped from the mid-twenties
onwards, they had to deal with an increase in bureaucratic tasks, whilst during the early
thirties political radicalism and growing unemployment burdened their workload. Bessel
indicates the failure of the Schutzpolizei to develop a democratic relationship with the
German people in their confrontation with Communist demonstrators and workers in
May 1929 in Berlin (‘Blood May’), which left 33 dead (none of which were policemen) and
198 wounded17.
11 Peter Leßmann emphasizes the authoritarian and highly military basis of the police of the
Weimar Republic. The Social Democrat government intended to limit the use of the army
in policing (given its questionable loyalty to the Republic) and desired to create a police
that worked with and was a part of the civilian public. Yet, this did not preclude the
creation of a heavily armed police force that had to be able to deal with a Communist
revolutionary  threat.  Though  theSchutzpolizei managed  to  quell  a  major  Communist
uprising  in  Saxony  in  March  1921  without  substantial  army  support,  the  corps
subsequently  underwent  far  greater  instruction in  the  use  of  arms than in  ordinary
policing18.  Moreover,  many  police  leaders,  some  of  whom  Social  Democrats,  shared
authoritarian concepts concerning the role of the police as defender (by any means and
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regardless of legal considerations) of the German state and its people. Such concepts had
quite a lot in common with Nazi police theory19.
12 Much of  the  support  of  the  Weimar  police  for  the  Nazis  was  the  consequence  of  a
breakdown in law and order  characterized by political  violence,  as  well  as  a  shared
antipathy for the Communists,  and in some quarters,  the Social  Democrats,  too.  The
perceived failure of the Weimar Republic to empower the police to deal adequately with
ordinary crime was also crucial for police support of Nazism. Patrick Wagner shows, for
example,  how  the  Berlin  Kriminalpolizei  felt  frustrated  in  its  attempts  to  repress  a
powerful criminal underworld during the late twenties, because of excessive concerns on
the part of the judiciary for the rights of defendants, with the result that it was difficult
to have criminals convicted. This helped to intensify the belief among detectives that the
police  should have greater  power and autonomy from an excessively  Liberal  judicial
system in order to preventively detain habitual criminals, some of whom for life. Many
were undoubtedly moved by Nazi promises that if they came to power the police would
no  longer  be  humiliated  in  their  fight  against  crime20.  In  comparison  with  Weimar
Germany, the influence that matters concerning ordinary crime may have had on police
support for right-wing authoritarian take-overs in Italy and Spain does not appear to
have been the object of any detailed research.
13 As in Italy, there were professional reasons that accounted (directly or indirectly) for
police support for Nazism. Leßmann argues that many individuals joined the Schutzpolizei 
as an alternative to post-war unemployment after military demobilization. While during
the twenties police salaries were generally not better than those in the mainly lower-
middle  class professions  that  policemen  had  previously  occupied  (and,  indeed,  got
comparatively worse during the late twenties), policemen were grateful for a safe job. In
theory,  when  12-year  contracts  in  the  Schutzpolizei expired,  policemen  would  find
employment in other areas of state administration. In practice, this did not happen21. This
created tensions with the Social Democrat government and increased police support for
the Nazis. Ex-policemen were extremely bitter about their treatment by the Republic,
forming  protest  organizations,  which  openly  insulted  the  German  state  and  public
authorities  over  this22.  In  his  comparison  of  Italian  squadrismo  and  the  German  SA,
Reichardt argues, however, that police collaboration with the Nazis was not as open as in
Italy.  This  depended  on  the  fact  that  the  German state  exercised  greater  territorial
control in dealing with law and order difficulties. It managed to maintain greater loyalty
on the part of policemen as a result of career conditions that were still comparatively
better than in Italy23.  Liang’s research on the Berlin police shows how, as part of its
democratic training of the Schutzpolizei, the Republic encouraged policemen to exercise
their political rights by joining any legitimate political organization (as long as this did
not interfere with their line of duty).  Ironically, this may have increased rather than
reduced the risks of police involvement in Nazi activities. Police membership of both the
KPD and the NSDAP was only banned in 193024.
14 The Nazi  rise to power did not create serious difficulties for the German police.  The
showdown between the Social Democrat Prussian government and the pro-Nazi central
government of Franz Von Papen, which helped to pave the way for Hitler’s ascendancy to
power,  could  have  placed  the  police  in  the  dilemma  of  having  to  choose  between
defending  or  abandoning  the  Weimar  Republic.  However,  when on  20  July  1932  the
central government dismissed the Prussian government (claiming that it was unable to
maintain public order) and declared a state of martial  law, the Schutzpolizei were not
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ordered to defend the Prussian government, even though the legality of Von Papen’s
initiative was highly questionable. Liang notes that the fact that the Von Papen Putsch
‘appeared’ legal made it easier for the police to accept it25. The Prussian Minister of the
Interior, Carl Severing justified his failure to call out the Schutzpolizei on the grounds that
under martial  law the police were no longer subject to the authority of the Prussian
government. Liang argues that as long as their superiors did not resist the army, the
rank-and-file of the Schutzpolizei were hardly likely to react either. Moreover, most had
not evolved a sense of political self-reliance under the Weimar Republic, to which they
were mainly unsympathetic anyway. A few did contemplate armed resistance in support
of a minority of Republican officers26.
15 After  the  Von  Papen  Putsch  police  support  of  the  Nazi  movement  became  more
systematic. Liang notes that policemen turned a blind eye to Nazi activities and carried
out selective arrests to the advantage of Nazis when they were involved in fights with
Communists. Police support for the Nazis during this stage was more official than in Italy.
Policemen were allowed to join the Nazi party and openly went to Nazi rallies. The officer
corps elected a Nazi police major as chairman of the police officers’ union and police
officers’ civil service committee. Pro-Nazi police leaders intimidated the rank-and-file by
carrying out investigations of policemen for alleged acts of brutality against Nazis27. As
the above point indicates, many members of the German police were ‘induced’ to conform
to  the  change  in  regime.  Bessel  argues  that  while  many  police  officers  were  Nazi
supporters, just as many were not. Because of their sense of professional identity and
concern about their careers, those who were not fanatical Nazis most probably accepted
the transition to an authoritarian system founded on the restoration of order and respect
for the police28.
16 The rise to power of Francisco Franco in Spain was different from the Fascist and Nazi
ascendancies  in that  it  followed military insurrection against  the government of  the
Popular Front. Levels of political violence during the phase leading up to the military
rebellion were far higher than in pre-Nazi Weimar Germany and pre-Fascist Liberal Italy.
Moreover, the violence mainly came from left-wing groups and parties,  including the
Socialists, with the Falangists playing a more defensive role and acting in isolated groups
in comparison to well-organized squads of Blackshirts or Stormtroopers29. From early on
in  the  Spanish  Civil  War,  the  Falangists  and  Carlists  played  an  auxiliary  role.  Their
militias were subordinate to military authority and a future head of state that favoured
an all-embracing partido único30.
17 Public order policies of the Spanish Second Republic (1931-1936) also played their part in
determining the military rebellion. The Republic was initially tough on law and order, but
this  combined in  a  contradictory  manner  with  a  restructuring  and  attempted
democratization (in the wake of the defeat of the de Rivera dictatorship) of the armed
forces that had traditionally been responsible for law and order maintenance in Spain.
According  to  Stanley  Payne,  military  reforms  did  not  weaken  the  scope  of  military
jurisdiction  in  Spain.  The  Law  for  the  Defence  of  the  Republic  of  1931  allowed  a
continuation of  strong  government  measures  and the  suspension of  civil  guarantees
where required. The new Public Order Law of 1933, replacing the 1931 law, provided for
states of legal exception of varying intensity but including the imposition of martial law,
while military courts continued to judge cases of abuse of power by the Civil Guard and
verbal insults against the Civil Guard31. There was some evidence of reform that was more
appropriate to a new ‘democratic’ state. Though the Socialists had wanted to disband the
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Civil Guard (Guardia Civil), given its reputation for brutality and severe dislike by left-wing
groups, the Republican government left the corps in tact but, following an attempted coup
by its former commander in chief, José Sanjurjo, in 1932, placed it under greater civilian
control. The Republican government also created a new national police force, the Assault
Guards (Guardia de Asalto) for service in the cities (alongside the urban Security police-
Seguridad) that was originally intended as a professionally trained civilian alternative to
the army or Civil Guard for dealing with urban unrest32.
18 In practice, however, any effort at creating a more liberal-minded police often gave way
to  authoritarian  solutions.  The  Republic  frequently  imposed  martial  law  and  other
restrictions on constitutional guarantees in the face of destabilization attempts by left-
wing  revolutionary  groups.  Moreover,  Manuel  Ballbé  suggests  that  any  move  in  the
direction of demilitarization of the police was superficial. The Assault Guards gradually
took on a military character, and only differed from the Civil Guard in name and uniform,
while a military figure still occupied the general inspectorate of the Civil Guard33. The
army,  Civil  Guard  and  the  Assault  Guards  behaved  brutally  in  the  face  of  peasant
rebellions  and  general  strikes,  and  with  relative  impunity.  During  an  anarchist
insurrection in January 1933 in the Cádiz province, for example, the Assault Guards shot
at least twelve peasants in cold blood. While they were in government (1931-1933), the
Socialists supported this tough public order stance especially because the main targets of
the repression (Communists and Anarcho-Syndicalists) were political rivals34.
19 If  the Second Republic attempted to be tough on law and order to the extent that it
frequently  sacrificed constitutional  liberties  and upheld pre-existing military powers,
according  to  Gerald  Blaney,  the  Civil  Guard  perceived  the  left-wing  government  of
1931-1933 as being ‘soft on revolution’ and tolerant of attacks against its members. It also
failed to appreciate the government’s attempt to deal with the root causes of disorder
through social and economic reform. At the local level, individual guards felt humiliated
at  having  to  take  orders  from  Republican  and  Socialist  councillors35.  It  is  likely,  in
addition,  that  increased  civilian  control  of  the  Civil  Guard,  though  of  questionable
significance in terms of law and order maintenance, and the dismissal of the commander
in  chief,  Sanjurjo,  in  1932,  because  of  his  suspected  disloyalty  to  the  government36,
outraged  many  within  the  corps.  Although  the  right-wing  government  of  1933-1936
supported the Civil Guard and repealed many of the reforms that it had ‘suffered’ under
the previous government37, the state of law and order progressively worsened during this
period. October 1934 saw a nationwide insurrection organized by the Socialists that had
to be sedated by means of martial law and fierce repression, which saw the death of
around  900  revolutionaries  and  between  144  and  168  policemen38.  Political  violence
escalated out of  control  again following the electoral  victory of the Popular Front in
February 1936. The fact that the government of Azaña-Casares Quiroga was reluctant to
employ the police effectively to deal with widespread strikes, and shootings by left- and
right-wing  extremists,  angered  them39.  So  did  an  amnesty  of  those  imprisoned  for
previous acts of violence, and the prosecution of Civil Guards considered responsible for
heavy-handed  repression40.  Moreover,  as  Payne  notes,  the  government  one-sidedly
attempted to outlaw the Falange (founded in November 1933) in March 1936, following its
assassination  attempt  on  the  Socialist  leader,  Jiménez  de  Asua,  whilst  not  imposing
equivalent measures against the revolutionary Left41.
20 According to Blaney, we may interpret the support of a large number of Civil Guards for
Franco’s military rebellion (possibly as many as 63%) as stemming from a traditional
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mentality in which the corps saw itself as ordained with the task of defending national
order. If necessary this meant turning against governments incapable of doing this. The
attempted coups of 1923 on the initiative of the commander of the Barcelona Civil Guard,
Primo de Rivera, and of August 1932 under Sanjurjo illustrate this42. Moreover, as Ballbé
argues,  lack  of  democratic  reform  of  the  police  administration  under  the  Republic
prevented an outright defence of constitutional powers in July 1936. Many military and
Civil Guard commanders were convinced that they held no responsibility if they obeyed
superiors in support of the conspiracy43. As traditional defenders of the landowning elite,
theCivil  Guard  in  many  instances  supported  an  uprising  that  wished  to  restore
conservative power to the Spanish countryside. In her research on the province of Huesca
(Aragón),  María  Pilar  Salomón Chéliz  argues  that  in  many  towns  the  victory  of  the
Nationalist  forces  depended  on  the  support  of  the  Civil  Guard,  backed  by  the  local
landowners, the Falange and other ‘men of order’. Once a town had fallen to the rebels,
they oversaw and enforced their assumption of political powers44. Immediately after the
Nationalist conquest of territory, spontaneous violence gave way to a more methodical
and  ordered  violence  – of  which  the  main  protagonists  were  the  police  forces,
particularly the Civil Guard – characterized by the organization of punitive expeditions
to those towns that had resisted the uprising, the execution of the ‘defeated’ and the
taking over of local prisons45.
21 The  above  comparative  analysis  has  illustrated  a  heterogeneous  set  of  factors
determining police support of the extreme Right, many of which were common to all
three national case studies. These included widespread social and political unrest, and an
increase in crime levels often connected to this. Institutional factors of direct concern to
the police were also crucial.  At the risk of somewhat oversimplifying highly complex
situations,  I  would argue that,  in  the  face  of  serious  law and order  difficulties,  new
regimes  that  were  politically  more  progressive  than  their  predecessors  did  not
dramatically  reform  police  systems  that  they  may  have  previously  considered
authoritarian and undemocratic, in spite of any claims that they were doing this. Indeed,
they maintained, whether deliberately, or inadvertently, an authoritarian police potential
that in the end would facilitate fascist  take-overs.  In the case of the Spanish Second
Republic  and  Weimar  Republic  left-wing  participants  in  government  supported  such
measures, if only to remove revolutionary rivals. Such policies did little, however, to win
over the full support of the police forces concerned, especially since they often clashed
with  democratic  initiatives  at  the  social  and  political  level  that  the  police  did  not
necessarily approve of.
22 We may question whether the findings of this analysis go some way towards supporting
(or are explained by) socio-psychological theory on police behaviour. Much of this theory
revolved around the assumptions that ‘a certain type of personality is drawn to careers in
policing; and that the roles the police play and the environment in which they operate
have predictable effects on their personalities and behaviour’46. Were policemen disposed
towards fascist movements because of a particular mindset? I would tentatively argue
that the police forces of the three countries investigated traditionally displayed an anti-
Left,  conservative and authoritarian orientation, which frequently manifested itself in
acts  of  brutality,  usually  against  the  peasant  and  working  classes.  In  view  of  the
particularly difficult professional situation policemen faced during the ‘Biennio Rosso’ in
Italy,  the  Weimar  Republic  and  the  Second  Spanish  Republic,  this  mentality  was
reinforced and eventually gave way to support for the extreme Right from many (but not
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all) quarters. Rather than indicating a particular type of personality or political leaning
behind  the  decision  to  join  the  police,  this  mentality  appears  mainly  to  be  the
consequence  of  particular  training  methods,  and  possibly,  in  the  case  of  Italy  and
Germany, the recent experience of war. Leßmann in his analysis of ‘Blood May’ indicates,
for example, that most Weimar police officers and instructors were ‘characterized by a
particular  approach  to  their  lives  and  careers,  which  bore  the  stamp  (…)  of  the
decivilized, self-sufficient life in the trenches on the Western Front’47.
23 The desire for a safe job and, where possible, a higher standard of living appeared to be
the main factors in decisions to join the police. In Italy, for example, the majority of
police recruits traditionally belonged to the peasant, artisan or working classes, usually
from the poorest regions of Italy, and having only completed primary education. Many
saw a police career as the only alternative to poverty and unemployment. The situation in
Spain appears similar48.  In Weimar Germany, recruits to the Schutzpolizei came from a
variety of professional backgrounds though generally of a more lower-middle class status
than in Italy and Spain. Many joined in order to overcome post-war unemployment. Over
75% of applicants for the post of sergeant had only completed primary school (Volksschule
)49.
24 The effect of social background on police behaviour is not wholly clear. Police experts in
Italy argued around the turn of the century that it was difficult to train police recruits
with low school qualifications properly, and that this was often the cause of casualties at
the scene of strikes and demonstrations. During the ‘Biennio Rosso’ exponents of the
Socialist Party claimed that the generally conservative outlook and limited education of
these  recruits  made it  easier  for  their  employment  in  hard-line  policing against  the
working class  movement.  Factors of  class  identification and geographical  provenance
appear to have played some role in police support for fascist movements. During the
‘Biennio  Rosso’  in  Italy,  frequent  insults  at  the  scene  of  demonstrations  and  in  the
Socialist  press,  founded  on  the  idea  that  the  police  had  betrayed  their  social  class,
increased the likelihood of their siding with the Fascists. Given their mainly Southern
peasant origin, they probably found it difficult to identify with the cause of the more
developed Northern worker and peasant movements50. Leßmann similarly suggests that
the German Communist Party failed to play on the class consciousness of members of the
Schutzpolizei because of their mainly peasant, artisan and lower-middle class backgrounds
51. Christoph Graf indicates that while the political police (Abteilung 1A) of the Weimar
Republic considered both Nazis and Communists as enemies, ‘the front line against left-
wing radicals was always more clear-cut than that against right-wingers,  because the
police not only regarded the communists as enemies of the state, but also as enemies of
their own class.’ Members of the NSDAP on the other hand were of a lower middle-class
background like members of Abteilung 1A52.
25 George Browder’s research indicates how socio-psychological theory can be applied to
help us understand police support of the extreme Right more clearly. Browder suggests
that the role conflicts experienced by the Weimar police produced a ‘pariah subculture’,
which facilitated the transition to Nazism. In the context of strikes, demonstrations and
riots and stagnation in their career advancement, they increasingly perceived the public
as hostile towards them. Their closed-group identity and sense of alienation from society
was  also  encouraged  by  training  programmes.  This  situation  increased  the  risks  of
subversion by political forces. The police were stuck between the demands of opposed
political groups. The forces of Liberalism and Socialism criticized them for their use of
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force to defend the Republic, while the Right criticized them for their alleged failure to
maintain order and protect society. The police felt more professionally threatened by the
former, particularly the parties of the Left, given their desire to curb police powers. The
Nazis on the other hand were able to appeal to police sub-cultural values by emphasizing
the belief that they were an institution to be strengthened. While the Communists aimed
to subvert  and undermine the police  as  an instrument  of  capitalism,  the  Nazis  only
intimidated anti-Nazi policemen53.
 
The structure and role of police systems
26 While right-wing dictatorships claimed to maintain full control over societies by means of
all-powerful policing systems, in practice levels of success in this varied. In no case was
total control achieved. The second section of this essay compares the transformations
that the German, Italian and Spanish police systems underwent after the rise to power of
the extreme Right. It pays particular attention to their structures, the powers that they
enjoyed and their activities. It questions how attached or detached they were from pre-
existing police systems in terms of both the type of police force employed and the legal
systems supporting them, as well as the extent to which ideological forces (i.e. the ruling
party) influenced them. Such factors depended to some extent on the ideological and
political  foundations  of  the  regimes  concerned.  Although  the  Francoist  dictatorship
distinguished itself from both the Nazi and Fascist regimes because of the dominance of
the  military  in  policing,  the  Spanish  and  Italian  police  underwent  more  similar
developments, in comparison with the Nazi police, insofar as they both maintained strong
links  with  pre-existing  systems  and  were  not  subject  to  high  levels  of  ideological
infiltration.  This  would  reflect  the  development  of  authoritarian  (as  opposed  to
totalitarian)  dictatorships.  While  the  German  police  undoubtedly  underwent  a
considerable  process  of  ‘Nazification’,  indicating  a  more  determined  move  towards
totalitarian rule, the extent of this may have been overstressed.
27 In Italy, after Mussolini came to power at the end of 1922, the police played a key role in
the  outlawing  of  the  political  opposition,  especially  left-wing  parties  and  union
organizations,  and the dismantling of  the democratic framework of the Liberal state.
While they initially did this with the help of the semi-legal action of the Fascist squads,
emergency legislation increasingly enabled the police to close ‘subversive’ associations
and arrest  their leaders.  When by 1926 all  non-Fascist  parties and organizations had
become illegal, the police had the task of controlling and preventing any potential threat
to the stability and livelihood of the new regime. This involved closely monitoring the
activities of all citizens, including Fascist Party members. Though the police continued to
focus mainly on the working classes and known left-wing militants, since they considered
them to pose the greatest threat to the regime’s stability, they paid greater attention than
in  the  past  to  ‘moral  crimes’,  such  as  abortion  and,  during  the  mid-late  thirties,
homosexuality, which became crimes against the Italian race. The Public Security Law of
6 November 1926, which formed the basis of the new police code of 1931, increased police
powers  of  censorship,  arrest  and  control  over  associations,  and  reduced  judicial
guarantees  against  abuse  of  power.  The  instruments  of  ammonizione (imposing
restrictions on the movements and activities of individuals) and confino (internal exile),
though previously  used by the Liberal  police  (as  stipulated by the 1889 police  code)
against habitual or suspected criminals and political offenders as a means of avoiding
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lengthy court procedures, could now be employed more straightforwardly than before
and against anyone considered socially or politically dangerous. The law of 25 November
1926 on ‘Measures for the Defence of the State’ placed individuals arrested for the most
serious political crimes before a special tribunal (Tribunale speciale per la difesa dello Stato)
over which the ordinary magistracy had no influence. The criminal code of 1930, besides
reducing the rights of legal defence in line with the Fascist concept of the infallibility of
the  state  and  subordination  of  the  rights  of  the  individual  to  those  of  society,  also
established more severe punishments for ordinary crimes54.
28 The  compromises  with  conservative  forces  forming  the  basis  of  the  Mussolinian
dictatorship prevented the creation of a totalitarian system of terror in Italy. Policing
remained in the hands of traditional forces of law and order (Interior Ministry police and
the  Carabinieri)with  the  Party  militia  playing  a  secondary  role  in  law and  order
maintenance, following its placing under the control of the army in 1924 in the aftermath
of the Matteotti murder. From 1925, the main responsibility of defence of state security
was entrusted to the Interior Ministry police under the leadership of the career prefect,
Arturo  Bocchini.  Common  to  all  dictatorships,  Bocchini  intensified  police  powers  of
surveillance by setting up several new secret organizations (of which the most notorious
was OVRA – Opera per la Vigilanza e Repressione dell’Antifascismo)employing informers in
order not only to root out and prevent the resurgence of underground anti-Fascism but
also to control Fascist dissidence and closely monitor public opinion55.
29 In contrast to Fascist Italy, Francoist repression was far more violent. As the research of
Michael Richards indicates, it involved not only the extermination or imprisonment of
large numbers of Republican supporters, but also a broader persecution and humiliation
of  members  of  the  working  classes  as  a  whole,  on  the  grounds  that  they  had  been
‘contaminated’ by ‘Liberalism’ and ‘Marxism’ during the Second Republic. The repression
also targeted women in the belief that the Republic had lured them away from their
traditional ‘passive’ role, as well as Catalonian and Basque pro-separatists. A combination
of Catholic and extreme nationalist beliefs gave moral justification to the repression56.
New laws sanctioned the repression.  The Law against  Military Rebellion of  July 1936
allowed  mass  executions  of  individuals  accused  of  having  ‘rebelled’  against  Franco’s
uprising. The Law of Political Responsibilities of February 1939 allowed the prosecution
by special courts of anyone who had supported the ‘Reds’ (including involvement in legal
political  and  trade  union  activities)  since  1934.  The  wording  of  the  Law  for  the
Suppression of Masonry and Communism of March 1940 was vague enough to allow the
persecution of most opposition to the new regime. Laws passed ‘for the protection of the
birth rate’ and ‘against abortion’ (January 1941) and against infanticide and adultery (May
1942) aimed to restore women to their traditional social role57.
30 Ordinary law courts increasingly lost influence, as the judgement of political crimes and
crimes against public order was entrusted to military or special courts in which judicial
guarantees,  such as the right to defence,  were seriously reduced and over which the
regime had more direct powers of interference58. The ordinary courts also lost control
over the repression of some common crimes, such as smuggling, illegal provisioning and
embezzlement,  which  carried  harsher  penalties  than  before59.  Moreover,  the  regime
created a special court, over which career judges directly appointed by the Ministry of
Justice  presided,  and  a  national  registerin  order  to control  and  preventively  intern
tramps and criminals,  though in practice  such measures  could be applied to anyone
considered socially undesirable or dangerous60.
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31 The Francoist system of repression in many respects represented a continuation of public
order policies of the Second Republic. Franco’s rebels used existing military powers and
jurisdiction in matters of law and order, as well as new legislation. The 1933 Public Order
Law (discussed above) remained in force until  1959. This was bolstered by a new law
(March 1943) defining any form of infringement of public order (including participation
in oppositional political activities) as military rebellion, and by the new Military Justice
Code of 1945 that treated disobeying or offending the police as a crime against the armed
forces to be dealt with by military courts. Between 1936 and 1975, the regime maintained
an almost continuous state of martial law (briefly interrupted during the mid-late sixties).
Though a decree of April 1948 officially ended this, political offences continued to go
before  courts  martial  and  usually  resulted  in  long  periods  of  imprisonment61.  The
regime’s treatment of social outcasts and other ‘dangerous’ individuals represented an
intensification of measures sanctioned by legislation of the Second Republic (Ley de Vagos
y  Maleantes of  1933)  that  allowed  restrictions  on  liberty  without  a  specific  crime
necessarily having been committed62. However, the Franco regime also introduced of a
system of conditional liberty (libertad vigilada) for released prisoners that was similar to
the Italian system of ammonizione. Citizens affected by this (300,000 in 1946) could not live
or work in their previous place of residence and had to report to the police one a week63.
32 The Spanish police forces did not undergo dramatic modifications after the civil war. The
Police Law of 1941 amalgamated the Seguridad and Asalto, renaming them Policía Armada.
The Guardia  Civil  was subjected to tighter  control  by the army,  while the Carabineros
(border and coastal police) were integrated into the corps64. Like most dictatorships, the
Francoist system saw an increase in surveillance activities run by information networks
relying  on  informers.  According  to  Max  Gallo,  in  1946  the  Civil  Guard  received  the
equivalent of fifty million dollars for this purpose65. Payne notes that there were at least
eight secret service and information agencies by the sixties though most of them were
superficial66. Levels of ‘fascistization’ within the police were low as political power was
subordinate  to  military  authority.  Moreover,  the  Falangist  and  Carlist  militias  were
dissolved in 194467. The Falange had come to power because of the military uprising and
its power never equalled that of the Nazi Party (NSDAP) or Fascist Party (PNF)68.
33 The structure of the Nazi police system indicates a stronger break in continuity with the
past. The Nazis played a key role in a terror system, as exemplified by the responsibility
given to the Party militia, the SS (Schutzstaffel),  for management of the concentration
camps and, from 1939 onwards, for bringing to fruition Hitler’s mass murder programme.
While there is some justification for comparing the SS with the Italian Fascist Militia,
entrusted with running penal colonies for political dissidents and other ‘anti-nationals’,
the powers and scope of activity of the former, who gradually became autonomous from
the state, army and even Party, bear no comparison with the second-class position of the
latter69.  Martin  Broszat  analyses  the  processes  by  which  the  German  police  were
‘Nazified’.  The  Interior  Ministry  lost  direct  control  over  the  police  when,  in  1936,  a
leading Nazi, Heinrich Himmler, started a process of centralization of the police (which
until 1933 had largely functioned on a federal basis) and their fusion within the SS, as he
took up the title of Reich SS Leader and Chief of Police within the Reich Ministry of
Interior.  Although  this  title  theoretically  made  Himmler  subordinate  to  the  Reich
Minister of Interior,  this was increasingly nominal.  The process of centralization and
‘Nazification’ of the police saw the creation within the Reich Ministry of the Interior of a
Security  Police  (Sicherheitspolizei)  Head  Office  (incorporating  the  Gestapo  and 
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Kriminalpolizei)  and of  an Order  Police  (Ordnungspolizei)Head Office  (incorporating  the
Schutzpolizei alongside the municipal police, fire brigade and administrative police) under
the  leadership  of  high-ranking SS  figures.  Broszat  questions,  however,  the  extent  to
which this process reached completion70.
34 The creation of a system of Polizeijustiz allowed the Nazi police to detain large numbers of
individuals in concentration camps, often indefinitely, without having to go through the
courts.  The presidential  decree of 4 February 1933 for the ‘Protection of the German
People’,  followed by the decree for the ‘Protection of the People and the State’  of 28
February 1933, empowered the Gestapo to apply arbitrarily preventive custody (Schutzhaft)
and preventive detention (Vorbeugungshaft),  as civil  and legal  rights were indefinitely
suspended.  Such  measures  initially  affected  Communists  and  Socialists.  However,
legislation  passed  on  24  November  1933  also  allowed  the  Kriminalpolizei  to  operate
preventive  detention  against  habitual  criminals  or  individuals  considered  capable  of
committing crimes. The Nuremberg laws of September 1935 sanctioned the detention of
Jews and non-Jewish sympathisers. From the mid-thirties onwards individuals suspected
of sexual ‘deviance’, particularly homosexuals, could also be interned. Illegal abortion and
sexual  relations  between  Aryans  and  Jews  also  became  a  preoccupation  of  the
Kriminalpolizei  and  the  Gestapo.A  decree  of  14  December  1937  extended  the  range  of
individuals  subject  to  preventive  detention  to  include  beggars,  vagabonds,  gypsies,
prostitutes, the work-shy and other categories of Asoziale (‘anti-socials’)71.
35 There are some notable differences between the Nazi Polizeijustiz and the policing systems
of  the other  right-wing dictatorships  discussed.  From 1936 onwards,  the Gestapo and
Kriminalpolizei were more or less able to act above the law and outside the control of the
Interior Ministry or judiciary. Their decisions on the fate of their victims were not subject
to outside scrutiny. They also had the power to intervene correctively in the sentences of
not  only  the ordinary courts  but  also  Nazi  judicial  institutions,  such as  the People’s
Tribunals.  Once prisoners  had completed their  sentences,  they could face preventive
arrest. Neither the Fascist nor the Francoist police had quite the same level of autonomy.
In Fascist Italy, both OVRA and the provincial police authorities handed over their victims
to the Special Tribunal for judgement of the most serious crimes72. The fate of those guilty
of less serious crimes was decided by provincial committees, of which the police chief (
Questore)was  only  one  of  several  members  (Prefect,  Carabinieri commander,  Militia
commander  and  public  prosecutor),  set  up  to  sentence  individuals  to  confino  or 
ammonizione. However, if the Special Tribunal acquitted a defendant for lack of evidence,
the police could propose him for confino on the grounds that he posed a threat to public
security73.  Once an individual completed a confino sentence,  the police could put him
forward for ammonizione. In Franco’s Spain, military and special courts decided the fate of
‘offenders’. In contrast to Nazi Germany, the decision to preventively intern individuals
considered dangerous or socially undesirable was also in the hands of a special court (
Vagos y Maleantes)rather than the police74.
 
Police personnel
36 This  section  analyses  the  use  and  treatment  of  police  personnel  under  right-wing
dictatorships.  Initially,  all  three  regimes  examined  implemented  purges  among  pre-
existing personnel, the dimensions of which depended on the extent of opposition to the
incoming political order. After the purges, varying levels of ‘fascistization’ of personnel
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took place. While the extent of this depended on the balance of power between Party and
state, it is clear that there remained a dilemma over how far ideological figures could be
relied  on  for  professional  police  work,  and,  conversely,  how  politically  trustworthy
professional policemen were, particularly for more radical forms of policing.
37 At first glance, it would appear that few members of the Weimar police were sacked when
Hitler came to power in 1933.  By the end of  1933,  only 7.3% of  officers and 1.7% of
constables  of  the Prussian Schutzpolizei  had been dismissed or  pensioned off75.  A few
members  of  the  criminal  police  (Kriminalpolizei)  lost  their  jobs  because  of  their
commitment to the old regime. With regard to SPD supporters in the political police (
Abteilung 1A),  prominent officials faced the sack, while the others were transferred to
non-political  jobs76.  If  we consider the treatment of  police personnel  after  July 1932,
however, it is clear that an earlier purge took place in some quarters. As Graf points out
with regard to the political police, most officials known for their loyalty to the Weimar
Republic had already been removed after the Von Papen Putsch77. Liang notes, however,
that  the  Nazis  showed  some  concern  to  employ  good-quality  policemen  over  Nazi
sympathisers. Schupo men with a poor record previously dismissed because of their Nazi
sympathies were more likely to be pensioned off than reinstated. Occasionally, policemen
with  a  reputation  for  Republican  sympathies  were  given  the  chance  to  prove  their
patriotic loyalty under the Third Reich78.
38 As the above points suggest, while Nazis infiltrated the pre-existing police organizations
and the SS played a prominent part in the most radical forms of policing, the system still
strongly relied on professional policemen. With regard to the Gestapo,Eric Johnson notes
that the local branch commanders were active Nazis, whether police professionals who
had joined the SA and SS before 1933,  or Nazis that subsequently joined the Gestapo.
However, the rank-and-file officers were usually without Nazi membership when they
joined and they subsequently may or may not have joined the Party and/or SS79. Robert
Gellately argues that there was a high carry-over of personnel to the Gestapo from the
Weimar political police. A gradual infiltration of Party, SA or SS members into the Gestapo 
also took place but where political appointees did not meet the professional requirements
of the job, more qualified personnel would take their place80.
39 In practice, Himmler’s planned incorporation of the police into the SS (whether through
the infiltration of SS members into the police or police personnel joining the SS) was slow
and only partially successful. Robert Koehl argues that in September 1939, only 3,000 out
of 20,000 Gestapo officials had SS rank. The proportion of SS members in the other police
forces  (Kriminalpolizei and  Ordnungspolizei)  was  even  smaller.  Most  members  of  the
Security  Police  (Gestapo and  Kriminalpolizei)were  professional  police  officials  that
‘exemplified the traits of conscientious bureaucrats willing to serve the Nazi cause rather
than of devoted SS men’81. This created rivalry. In referring to the relationship between
the  Gestapo and  the  SD  ( Sicherheitsdienst  – SS  Security  Service),  Browder  refers,  for
example to the fact that: ‘Gestapo detectives viewed SD men as Nazi amateur interlopers.
SD men doubted the ideological  understanding and commitment of  the detectives to
combating well-camouflaged enemies whose spirit was present even in many Catholic and
conservative detectives themselves’82.
40 While  Johnson suggests  that  Gestapo officers  with Party  or  SS  membership  were  not
necessarily  distinguished  from  those  without,  when  it  came  to  evaluating  their
willingness to serve the Third Reich (and commit inhumane acts)83, independent of Party
or SS membership, all policemen were ‘schooled’ in Nazi ideology from early on in the
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dictatorship. By the mid-thirties, members of the SS were  giving the lectures84. In this
sense ‘fascistization’ of the police was probably more thorough than in Italy or Spain.
Wagner  suggests,  however,  that,  independent  of  Nazi  ideology,  the  development  of
genetically based criminological theory also facilitated support of Nazi atrocities. Without
being Nazis in the strict sense of the word, Paul Werner, responsible for the decree of
December  1937 that  allowed the persecution of  ‘anti-social’  categories,  and his  close
collaborator, Robert Ritter, a criminal biologist, saw Nazism as the ideal environment in
which to test their ideas concerning the genetic origins of criminal behaviour. During the
late thirties, it was certainly not necessary to be a Nazi in order to support such ideas,
which  greatly  appealed  to  the  Kriminalpolizei and  represented  the  culmination  of
scientifically based debate concerning the elimination of crime that began before Hitler
came to power85.
41 The transition to dictatorship was initially far from smooth for Italian police personnel.
Though Mussolini entrusted the most sensitive policing tasks to the Interior Ministry
from 1925 onwards, between 1922 and 1925 he had favoured the Carabinieri in view of the
association of the former with previous Liberal governments. At the end of December
1922,  he  dealt  a  blow  to  the  Interior  Ministry  by  abolishing  the  Agenti  Investigativi
(detective force) and the Guardie Regie. Only about 25% of their personnel were transfered
to the Carabinieri, the remainder effectively losing their jobs86. Mussolini’s relegation of
the Carabinieri to a secondary position and his re-creation of an Interior Ministry police
corps, named Agenti di Pubblica Sicurezza,in 1925 reflected his awareness of the ultimate
loyalty of the former to the crown87. Because of Mussolini’s increasing reliance on trained
professionals of the state police over and above the Party militia, rather than infiltrating
the ranks  of  the  police  with political  figures,  new legislation made it  easier  to  sack
policemen considered professionally incompetent or unable to fulfil  the government’s
political directives88.
42 The requirement of PNF membership for new state appointments from 1932 onwards,
whilst allowing a formal ‘Fascistization’ of police personnel, was not in itself an indication
of  ideological  conformity  in  the  police.  However,  from  the  thirties  onwards  young
recruits  to  the  police  would  have  undergone  a  Fascist  education  at  school,  while
individuals who had activiely supported the Fascist movement before the March on Rome
were from the mid-thirties onwards given a measure of preference over others both in
state competitions for employment in the police and for promotion and recognized years
of service, as throughout state administration. There is also evidence of the incorporation
of Fascist ideology into training and manuals, though this does not appear to have been as
systematic  and  intensive  as  ideological  training  in  the  German  police89.  How  far
indoctrination in Fascist  ideology was  required to  encourage the police  to  serve the
dictatorship  is  questionable.  Many  older  policemen  were  ideologically  sympathetic
towards Fascism and believed that it was creating a new social order that would enjoy
lower crime rates90.  Fascism certainly  gave the Interior  Ministry greater  powers  and
decision-making autonomy, as well as new career possibilities, as it entrusted them with
the task of defending the regime91. Police organizations also enjoyed greater prestige
than before, as evident in the institution in 1928 of an annual festa della polizia (the Fascist
equivalent of the Nazi Tag der deutschen Polizei92). Yet, in the end, many members of the
police failed to show the level of loyalty required of them, as discussed in more detail
below.
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43 With regard to Spanish police personnel, the research of Manel Risques Corbella shows
how high-ranking members of the Civil Guard that had not sided with the Nationalist
rebels faced the death penalty or long prison sentences. On 10 March 1939, for example, a
court-martial  sentenced  to  death  a  number  of  Civil  Guard  commanders  accused  of
opposing and preventing the  military  rebellion in  Barcelona in  July  1936.  In  reality,
Risques argues, they had acted out of a sense of discipline and professionalism, not as
enthusiastic Republicans. They had done their best to avoid direct conflict with the rebels
and, after the rebellion had failed, had protected them from revenge attacks. Several had
later  been retired  for  alleged disloyalty  to  the  Republic93.  Little  is known about  the
purging process that lower-ranking members of the Civil Guard, or members of other
police forces,  underwent.  After the civil  war,  the enforcement of  rigid discipline and
ideological  conformity helped to maintain Civil  Guard loyalty to the Franco regime94.
According to Diego López Garrida, throughout the period of Francoist rule, the ideological
concepts and content of training manuals for members of the Civil Guard were highly
authoritarian, indicating Socialism, Marxism and Communism, but also Liberalism and
some forms of  democracy as the causes of  political  subversion95.  All members of  the
military had to belong to the Movimiento (Falangist Party)96. Yet, the direct influence of
the Falange in matters of police training is questionable, given its subordinate position in
the Francoist state. Material reward and a sense of professional prestige may also have
reinforced police loyalties to the regime. Payne notes, for example, that the rank-and-file
members of the Civil Guard enjoyed status similar to NCOs with high wages and housing
privileges97.
44 The above point indicates how myriad interlinked factors come into play to determine
loyalty  levels.  Alongside  economic  treatment,  ideological  training  and  systems  of
discipline, we should consider career incentives, and policing resources and workloads. In
the Italian case it is evident, for example, that, while high-ranking officials of the Interior
Ministry police were able to take advantage of important career opportunities, employees
of the provincial Questure (police headquarters) often demonstrated a ‘work-shy’ attitude
without  incurring  serious  punishment98.  Fascism  failed  to  enforce  sufficiently  rigid
disciplinary regimes or ideological loyalty, whilst inadequate resources made it difficult
to  sack  unreliable  personnel  and  recruit  better  quality  police  applicants.  Lack  of
professional enthusiasm was also a consequence of increased workloads99. Loyalty levels
among the German police appear to have been higher. This may have been a result of
more  rigid  disciplinary  regimes,  higher  levels  of  political  indoctrination and greater
career opportunities (discussed below). Working conditions were not necessarily ideal.
We  know  that  the  Gestapo suffered  from limited  resources  leading  to  understaffing,
overwork  and  inefficiency.  On  the  other  hand,  the  reduced  forces  (in  relation  to
population) of the Kriminalpolizei appeared to benefit from a lower workload because of
greater standardization under the Nazis100.
 
The employment of terror
45 The final section of this essay analyses and compares levels of terror characterizing the
police systems under examination. It also considers the role played by the public in the
creation of terror through systems of denunciation. It questions whether radical forms of
policing were products of practices or mentalities carried over from previous regimes or
represented a true and proper break in continuity brought on by processes of ideological
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infiltration, disciplinary control or force of circumstance. Finally, it considers the extent
to which regimes made use of systems of repression or terror at their disposal, as well as
the overall effectiveness of such systems in creating social and political conformity.
46 The Fascist police did not engage in systematic terror on the scale of Nazi Germany or the
first years of the Franco regime, but this does not mean that they did not instil greater
fear in the minds of Italian citizens than their Liberal predecessors did. One only has to
consider the presence throughout Italian society of surveillance organizations employing
informers  to  appreciate  this.  It  is  true  that  organizations  like  OVRA  are  hardly
comparable with the Gestapo. Italo Savella argues, for example, that while OVRA officials
threatened and blackmailed arrested anti-Fascists to get information from them, they did
not employ physical torture. Bocchini did not intend to create martyrs for the anti-Fascist
cause101. However, there is evidence to suggest that OVRA and the regular police forces on
occasion engaged in the physical and psychological torture of prisoners. The question
remains whether this differed radically from tactics used under the Liberal state. The
Militia also gained a reputation for cruel treatment of prisoners in the penal colonies102.
In considering factors accounting for terror levels,  it  is clear that in Italy the police,
though gaining greater autonomy from the judiciary, remained accountable to a legal
system that was authoritarian but did not match up to the totalitarian designs of the most
radical Fascists. It embodied racial theories that from the late thirties onwards allowed
the imposition of restrictions on the rights and movements of Jews, for example, but not
their extermination103.
47 Nevertheless, the Fascist potential for terror should not be underestimated. The creation
of a myth of ‘good’ Italians, that helped to distinguish them from their ‘cruel’ German
allies, allowed the race discrimination laws of 1938 and atrocities committed by Italian
occupying forces in Ethiopia and the Balkans to be erased from collective memory104. It is
evident that during the Second World War onwards, the regime put forward plans for
more  radical  forms  of  repression  that  would  involve  the  police.  This  included  the
permanent removal from society of habitual criminals incapable of rehabilitation105, and
the creation of concentration camps specifically for Jews106. While the Fascist regime of
1926-1943 never put such plans into practice,  policemen were expected to engage in
inhumane acts under the Italian Social Republic, created in September 1943, following the
Nazi occupation of Central and Northern Italy. Under the control of newly appointed
Fascist Party police chiefs, many were involved, directly or indirectly, in atrocities against
partisans and the deportation of Jews to Nazi death camps. There was a notably high level
of dissociation from the Social Republic within the police. Yet, high desertion rates are no
sure indication that  the police  would not  have supported or  complied with a  terror
system had it been set up in different circumstances. A refusal to engage in atrocities
partly accounts for desertions. However, they were also a result of an overriding desire
for self-preservation in the face of impending military defeat. Many Carabinieri deserted
in view of Nazi plans to deport them to Germany107.
48 While the widespread role of the German police in terror is certain, the question remains
how spontaneously they employed it.  If the Weimar political police, for example, had
functioned  under  the  legal  constraints  of  a  democratic  state,  an  ability  to  behave
ruthlessly came easily to ex-members of the political police transferred into the Gestapo in
1933. Graf argues that when Hitler came to power, Abteilung 1A actively assisted in the
preparation, execution and safeguarding of the Nazi takeover. The Gestapo was associated
with terror  well  before  the SS gained control  over  it108.  Johnson’s  research similarly
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suggests that very early on the Gestapo tortured its prisoners in order to get information
out of them109. Yet, even within the Gestapo, a certain amount of psychological training in
radical policing was required. It was not difficult to create a situation in which the idea of
such  forms  of  policing  was  acceptable,  especially  if  they  were  entrusted  to  others.
Gellately  suggests that: ‘Nazi ideology (of which there were many variants) could readily
be grafted onto traditional demands of police for more power to fight criminals; for a
reduction of the rights of the accused; and for a campaign to clean up the country from
what many in the police regarded as criminal, or just immoral practices’110.  Similarly,
Browder argues that: ‘the common denominators of nationalism, anti-Communism, and a
general  combativeness  towards  anything  that  weakened  national  strength  created
powerful personal linkages that carried over from traditional detective to Gestapo and
finally SS work’111.
49 Browder suggests, however, that the psychological willingness to be directly involved in
such forms of policing was not so straightforward. The brutalization of behaviour within
both  the  Gestapo and  the  Kriminalpolizei was  partly  encouraged  by  the  presence  of
uniformed Nazi infiltrators that challenged the zeal of the professional policeman and
‘goaded him to take the extra step that proved patriotism and dedication’112. Referring to
socio-psychological  theory,  Browder  argues  that  compliance  in  inhumane  acts  was
achieved  through  processes  of  ‘authorization’  (those  in  authority  assume  moral
responsibility), ‘bolstering’ (group support and conformity), ‘routinization’ (focus on the
job rather than on the larger consequences) and ‘dehumanization’ (denying the humanity
of the victim and his right to moral consideration)113. The exploitation of rivalry between
police forces, without creating serious conflict between them, also served as a means of
inducing the employment of terror. Severin Roeseling argues that the Kriminalpolizei and
Gestapo competed  in  radical  forms  of  policing  in  their  efforts  to  fulfil  the  growing
demands of the political leadership114. Wagner also indicates that Himmler encouraged
competition  between  the  two  corps  in  fighting  homosexuality  in  order  to  achieve
maximum results115.
50 There is  a long-established myth that only the Gestapo and SS were involved in Nazi
crimes.  Yet,  Johnson argues that in rural  communities,  the regular police persecuted
Communists and non-conformists and deported Jews,  without the need to call  in the
Gestapo116. Nadine Rossol notes that while much of the ‘ordinary’ police work was defined
more by administrative paper work than by ruthlessness, it was not less effective. On the
basis of her research on the Schutzpolizei and administrative police of Cologne, Rossol
argues that  an already existing administrative apparatus provided the Nazis  with an
instrument for persecuting Jews. Under the direction of a non-Nazi Catholic civil servant
appointed  to  the  Cologne  police  presidency  after  the  Von  Papen  Putsch,  the  police
targeted the Jews as a distinct group in society in 1933 and 1934. This also involved a
census of Jewish shops, pubs and restaurants,  which would play a crucial part in the
destruction of Jewish property during the pogrom of November 1938. The administrative
police collaborated and co-operated with the Gestapo in anti-Jewish policies without any
serious difficulties or friction. Yet, it was precisely the breaking down of the process of
persecution into small administrative tasks that helped to salvage the consciences of the
‘ordinary’ policemen involved117. Thomas Roth similarly argues that the breakdown of the
process of classifying and arranging the deportation of ‘anti-socials’ from 1938 onwards
allowed members  of  the Kriminalpolizei  to  distance themselves  from the fate  of  their
victims118.
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51 Ironically,  it  may have been an illusionary self-image of  professional  autonomy from
Nazism that placed ‘ordinary’ policemen on the slippery path to mass murder. Browder
suggests  that  professional  policemen  in  the  Gestapo  and  Kriminalpolizei were  ‘willing
participants in the first  steps toward the police state’,  but that they later suffered a
professional identity crisis in the face of the realities of SS penetration. Whilst a few
members resigned, most deluded themselves that they were not acting inhumanely by
clinging to a false image, which the Nazi leadership had built up, of a professional police
force honoured and trusted by the people, and denied anything more than a formal link
with the SS-SD. Moreover, they could deny ‘police responsibility’ for actions that tainted
their  professionalism  by  blaming  SS-SD  men  among  them.  Browder  interprets  such
behaviour  as  the  product  of  an  ego-institutional  identity  that  involved  ‘healthy’
individuals  (i.e.  without  sadistic  or  criminal  personalities),  whether  professional
policemen or Nazis, in atrocities119.
52 In attempting to define the precise nature of Franco’s repressive system, it is necessary to
make a separation in terms of the intensity and dynamism of repression between two
periods. The period of the civil war and the years immediately following the cessation of
hostilities were years of extreme terror, characterized by around 145,000 executions, by
the  most  recent  estimates120,  whilst  400,000  individuals  spent  time  in  prison,
concentration camps or labour squads121. The extremely high figures for the initial years
of Francoist rule are partly explained by the desire to settle accounts after a bloody civil
war  following a  code  that,  as  Richards  indicates,  erased the  words  ‘forgiveness’  and
‘amnesty’  from the Spanish language122.  Legislative measures sanctioned the terror.  A
combination  of  scientific  theory  and  Catholic  doctrine  arguing  that  Liberals  and
Communists carried the traits of  physical,  psychological  and racial  degeneration that
only national and Christian purification could cure aimed to justify it  morally123.  The
subsequent 25-30 year period lasting until Franco’s death in 1975 involved less systematic
terror that was to some extent conditioned by the formal endorsement of human rights
in  the  Charter  of  the  Spanish  People  of  1945  (though  many  of  its  provisions  were
constantly violated)124.
53 At first glance, it might seem that police participation in terror during and immediately
after the civil  war, did not differ greatly from traditional methods of repressing civil
unrest. As indicated above, the police of the second Republic had often functioned under
the protection of military rule or other ‘states of exception’, which allowed for brutal
behaviour  with  relative  impunity.  The  civil  war  experience  undoubtedly  increased
psychological acceptance levels of the more systematic employment of extreme violence.
The  involvement  of  the  Gestapo in  training  the  police  suggests,  however,  that  they
received instruction in more sophisticated methods of brutality. According to Gallo, from
1940 Himmler initiated collaboration between the German and Spanish police. He states
that by 1946:
Franco’s  police,  while  retaining  all  its  original  brutality,  had  now  perfected  its
methods. Guided by German experts, trained in the school of Hitler’s Gestapo, it had
acquired all the techniques which had formed the strength of the Nazi repressive
organizations. It had learnt the art of infiltration into underground networks, of
waiting  before  pouncing,  of  setting  traps,  and  it  had  adopted  many  of  the
techniques of interrogation after arrest, with graduated degrees of violence, which
might lead a prisoner to break down and confess,  or to commit suicide. Former
members of the German police or the French militia had been more or less officially
engaged by Spanish police organizations, which could take their pick among the
many refugees who had come into Spain125.
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54 From  the  fifties  onwards,  terror  might  have  been  applied more  sporadically  but  it
continued to form a key part of Francoist rule. While there were fewer shootings, for
example, during strikes and demonstrations, there were a significant number of cases of
the police brutally torturing individuals in their custody126.
55 The collaboration of  the public in enforcing social  control  and creating terror under
dictatorships  has  recently  been  the  subject  of  debate.  Angela  Cenarro  notes  that  in
Franco’s Spain, denunciation was considered one of the most effective means of creating
consensus around the new regime. Sanctioned by a decree of April 1940, calling for an
investigation of crimes committed by the ‘Reds’, and officially encouraged in the press
and on the radio, widespread denunciation by the victors of those that had served the
Republican cause formed an integral  part  of  the process  of  settling of  accounts  and
purging society127. For Nazi Germany, Gellately has emphasized the reliance of a relatively
undermanned  Gestapo organization  on  the  help  of  the  German  public 128.  However,
Johnson’s research on the town of Krefeld concludes that not more than 2% at most of the
population denounced anyone129. The apparent lack of denunciations in Fascist Italy has
recently been the object of reappraisal. Over a decade ago, Tim Mason, suggested that
levels of denunciation were lower than in Nazi Germany and argued that this might be
because  of  an  inbuilt  mistrust  of  the  state  and  a  cultural  code  of  omertà130.  Mason
appeared to have based his argument on research on the working class of Turin. It is
plausible that close-knit working class communities with a strong subversive tradition
may  have  been  less  permeable  to  betrayal.  Recent  research  by  Mimmo  Franzinelli
suggests that a considerable number of Italians denounced their fellow citizens to the
benefit of the police. If there is a distinction between Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, it
possibly lies in the fact that a much higher percentage of  Italian citizens denounced
anonymously131. However, it is likely that, in comparison with Spain, a lower proportion
of citizens spied on and denounced their neighbours in Germany and Italy, given the less
dramatic circumstances in which the Nazi and Fascist regimes came to power.
56 If, in all three cases, we look at the policing of populations as a whole rather than focus on
targeted groups, similar treatment, which does not rely on terror alone, emerges. This
particularly  regards  the  policing  of  the  working  classes.  Although  strikes  and
demonstrations became illegal, the regimes concerned did not automatically deal with
them in a harsh manner. In Fascist Italy the police were often reluctant to do anything
more  than  arrest  the  main  promoters  when  work  stoppages  took  place.  Following
practices  more  reminiscent  of  the  Liberal  state,  they  sometimes  took  measures  to
alleviate the cause of disputes and to encourage mediation132. Detlev Peukert argues that
in spite of the ‘terroristic’ capacity of the Gestapo,  the Nazi regime tolerated a certain
amount of ‘passive aversion’ on the part of workers, and even small-scale strikes133. Ian
Kershaw’s research on Bavaria also demonstrates that the police did not automatically
quell  worker  unrest,  which  was  particularly  rife  during  1935-1936134.  In  both  Nazi
Germany  and  Fascist  Italy,  the  authorities  appeared  to  attempt  to  strike  a  balance
between repression and concession, the latter seen as necessary to win round the workers
to the political cause of the regimes concerned. Richards suggests that, though in the very
early years of the Francoist regime strike organisers could face execution without trial,
from the mid-forties Spanish workers were on occasion able to stage protests without
excessive harassment from the police.  In January 1946, the first general strike of the
Franco era took place in Manresa (Barcelona). The action resulted in a wage rise135.
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57 Under all three regimes, it would seem that citizens who were not engaged in subversive
activities or a specific target of repression were not necessarily kept in check by a sense
of terror or fear. While in Fascist Italy ‘ordinary’ citizens could in theory be intimidated
into collaborating with the police in supplying information on suspects and ‘subversives’,
in practice the sanctions they faced for failing to collaborate adequately appear to be
minimal136.  Johnson  argues  that,  as  long  as  they  were  upright  members  of  the
Volksgemeinschaft,  German citizens who gave vent to their  daily frustrations,  even by
openly criticising Hitler and the Nazi regime, rarely faced severe punishment137. Though
the above points require further substantiation, they are significant in that they suggest
that the exceptional powers of control given to dictatorial police systems were not used
to their full potential and that more traditional methods of policing based on mediation
and concession were sometimes employed in their place.
 
Conclusion
58 The above analysis has shown that the Nazi, Fascist and Francoist police systems present
notable differences, which are in part rooted in the diverse nature of the regimes behind
them and the circumstances that led to their creation. On the other hand, it is possible to
draw tentatively some parallels between the Nazi, Francoist and Fascist policing systems
(or  between two of  the  three  systems)  in  terms of  their  development,  though more
research is required in order to substantiate this. For example, although the Francoist
and  Fascist  systems  are  closer  in  terms  of  their  limited  ‘fascistization’  (whether  in
structure, juridical basis or personnel), the extent of ‘Nazification’ of the German police
may have been overstressed. Recent research on denunciations may have brought Fascist
Italy  and Nazi  Germany closer  together  than previously  imagined in  their  ability  or
willingness to ‘terrorize’.
59 This  article  has  given particular  emphasis  to  the use that  the dictatorships  made of
‘ordinary’ policemen. There are clear similarities in the motives for police support of
fascist movements. During periods leading up to the creation of right-wing dictatorships
police  forces  faced  serious  law  and  order  crises  that  bolstered  their  anti-Marxist,
authoritarian mentality and turned them against democratic forms of government. This
attitude was also a result of the introduction of ambiguous reforms in the police. In many
spheres of policing, it is not always easy to identify a clean break in continuity between
fascist policing methods and those of previous regimes, when examined from the point of
view of the individual police task, and this facilitated the ability of professional policemen
to  adapt  to  the  more  radical  requirements  of  the  dictatorships.  Both  pre-existing
ideological beliefs and career opportunism played some role in obtaining compliance in
this. Many policemen may have been disposed towards hard-line repression (including
atrocities), having also emerged from recent experiences of violence in which they had
already made enemies out of those groups that would be the subsequent focus (or part of
the focus) of repression under the dictatorships. We may be tempted to argue that levels
of ‘fascistization’ police forces underwent did not seriously determine their willingness or
ability to take part in particularly cruel forms of policing. On the other hand, there is also
evidence  to  suggest  that  some  form  of  ideological  or  psychological  instruction  was
required to obtain full compliance in such policing, no matter how theoretically disposed
‘ordinary’  policemen were,  though this  has  only been documented in detail  for  Nazi
Germany.
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60 This article has referred in places to the effect of war experience on the attitudes of the
police,  though  this  is  an  area  requiring  further  investigation.  It  is  likely  that  the
brutalizing  effects  of  war  both  conditioned  police  support  of  authoritarian  political
stances and facilitated the job of purging society after the rise to power of the extreme
Right. In Weimar Germany and pre-Fascist Italy, the employment of large numbers of
demobilized  soldiers  and,  perhaps  more  crucially,  officers138 in  the  police  may  have
determined an excessively confrontational attitude towards law and order maintenance,
exacerbating the divide between highly militarized police forces on the one hand and
civilian society on the other.  Moreover, the previous common experience of patriotic
‘camaraderie’ on war fronts may have brought policemen and members of right-wing
paramilitary groups closer together, making it easier for them to jointly carry out illegal
activities in support of  fascist  movements and,  in the immediate aftermath of fascist
seizures of power, widespread repression. In Spain, the brutalizing experience of the war
undoubtedly facilitated the violent purge of society that took place after the Nationalists
gained control of territory and continued after the official the cessation of hostilities in
April  1939.  Both fascist  and Liberal  regimes may have employed military-type tactics
directly inspired by recent war experience139, though we should not confuse such tactics
with those more traditionally associated with military policing.
61 The influence of war experience on the creation and policing of right-wing dictatorships
is one of many areas in which further research is required in order to make a more
effective  comparison  of  the  three  fascist  policing  systems  discussed  and  understand
better how they functioned. Greater analysis is necessary, for example, particularly for
Franco’s Spain and Fascist Italy, of the recruitment and training of policemen, the type of
everyday work they were engaged in, as well as the conditions in which they worked (in
terms of  resources,  disciplinary systems and economic treatment).  Moreover,  limited
research appears to have been conducted more specifically on what the creation of right-
wing dictatorships meant for the policing of ordinary crime in Italy and Spain. Future
analysis needs to involve where possible a greater understanding of the interpretations
that policemen themselves gave to their roles, in relation not only to their ideological
beliefs but also to their treatment as employees of professional bodies.
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ABSTRACTS
This article brings together the results of a preliminary comparative analysis of the policing of
Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and Franco’s Spain. Based on an examination of the role of the police
in the ascendancy of the Fascist, Nazi and Falangist political movements, the structures of the
police systems subsequently created, the type of police personnel operating under these regimes,
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and the extent of terror they employed, the article illustrates the contrasting features of the
police systems concerned but looks to identify similar patterns of development that would allow
the  formulation  of  a  model  for  the  creation  of  systems  of  repression  under  right-wing
dictatorships.
Cet article présente les résultats d’une première analyse comparative de la police dans l’Italie
fasciste, l’Allemagne nazie et l’Espagne franquiste. À partir de l’examen du rôle de la police dans
l’ascension des trois mouvements politiques, des structures policières établies subséquemment
par ces régimes et des caractéristiques du personnel policier qu’ils employaient, ainsi que du
degré de terreur auquel ils avaient recours, l’article montre le caractère contrasté des systèmes
policiers  étudiés,  tout  en  s’efforçant  d’identifier  des  cons tantes  de  développement  qui
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